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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
At the very heart of a changing society lies 
the number and composition of its members. 
Population growth has shaped the EU over 
recent decades and now its population is ageing. 
The slow-moving shift towards longer-living,  
lower-fertility, higher-educated societies brings  
the EU to new demographic frontiers, as it does  
in North America and East Asia. 
Facing these developments naturally prompts  
the questions: Who will live and work in Europe  
in the coming decades? How many, and with what 
skills? To answer these, we consider key factors 
that will influence European demographics over  
the coming decades.
To move beyond some common misconceptions, 
this report brings relevant scientific analyses  
to the forefront by presenting a series of 
demographic scenarios for the future of the EU.  
By examining not only the role of migration, fertility 
and mortality, but also education and labour force 
participation, we can outline a more comprehensive 
view of possible futures than conventional 
demographic projections. 
While some of the scenarios indicate probable 
developments, others are hypothetical and 
meant to be instructive for understanding the full 
spectrum of possible futures. The value of these 
scenarios is to improve our ability to anticipate 
the coming changes and to guide our responses 
to them. 
The following key messages express the core 
findings from the work of the Centre of Expertise 
on Population and Migration.
We are living longer and can lead 
more productive lives  
One of the most important trends in the EU  
is ageing. Thanks to advances in medicine and 
quality of life, the average life expectancy at birth 
in the EU is about 81 years. Shifts to longer lives 
come as part of the larger, nearly universal process 
of transitioning from pre-modern to post-industrial 
demographic patterns.
While it is an important achievement that we are 
on average living longer, an increasing proportion of 
people aged 65+ can also bring social and economic 
challenges. There are concerns about how to provide 
for the growing proportion of retired citizens who 
are dependent on a smaller labour force. Yet, absent 
from the often superficial discussions are reflections 
on the increasing number of years of active and 
healthy life, greater productivity, and possible loss 
of jobs due to technological advancements. All of 
which have profound implications on what societies 
will require from their future working populations. 
Automation alone may significantly cut the need 
for labour, calling into question conventional 
assumptions about what policymakers should target 
as the ‘ideal’ size of the labour force.
It is important to acknowledge that neither higher 
fertility nor more migration will stop population 
ageing because the momentum has been decisively 
set by past, long-term demographic trends. 
However, reaching the age of 65 is no longer 
synonymous with the end of a person’s productive 
life. Overall, we are living more productive lives 
which, together with flexible retirement ages, 
can help to alleviate the economic challenges 
arising from changes in the conventionally defined 
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working-age population and the increasing 
ratio of workers to non-workers (known as the 
dependency ratio).
A smaller, better-educated labour 
force on the horizon
Another reason for optimism is the fact that 
the EU’s labour force is clearly becoming better 
educated over time. In almost all scenarios, the 
EU’s future labour force will be more highly skilled 
and therefore likely to be more productive and 
adaptive to an ever-changing job market.
The EU labour force is transforming through social 
development and the ageing process. The total size 
of the labour force is projected to get smaller over 
the next four decades, based on the assumption 
that the current patterns continue. According to this 
assumption, the projected decrease in the size  
of the labour force will come from the population 
with low (from 50.7 to 14.0 million) and middle 
(from 108.2 to 74.2 million) levels of education. 
At the same time, the number of workers with 
a short post-secondary education (such as 
technical training), a bachelor’s, a master’s 
degree or higher, is rising, not just as regards their 
proportion of the overall labour force, but also  
in absolute terms. In every country, since the 
younger cohorts are better educated than the older 
ones, these post-secondary groups are expected  
to almost double (+45%) over the next 40 years.
Considering the future context, any possible 
reduction in the size of the labour force may  
not be an economic problem if future jobs are 
fewer in number and require more skills. Already 
today unemployment is generally higher among the 
lower skilled and there may be even fewer low skills 
jobs in the future. Regardless  of changes in the 
population’s age structure and labour force size,  
it can be expected that the human capital of future 
workers of any age, measured by the highest level 
of their educational attainment, will be higher than 
it is today. 
Labour force participation  
as a remedy for the challenges  
of population ageing 
Using a set of demographic scenarios of the future 
that highlight the impact of changes to a variety 
of factors, it becomes clear that the most feasible 
and effective remedy to negative consequences 
of population ageing is neither focusing on higher 
fertility nor more migration, but rather increasing 
labour force participation. 
Extending constant labour-force participation  
rates into the future shows the likely path  
to a smaller labour force and increasing 
dependency ratio. Scenarios that deviate from 
this course, following either 1) the equalisation 
of labour-force participation between men and 
women, or 2) a gradual convergence of all Member 
States to the participation rates of men and women 
already seen in Sweden today, demonstrate the 
power that improving labour-participation rates  
has to nullify potential increases in dependency.
In fact, the momentum is on the side  
of increasing labour-force participation.  
If it continues to grow in the future, the labour 
force size and dependency ratio could stabilise 
at current levels. In other words, a strong but 
realistic increase – as is already the reality  
in Sweden – of labour-force participation over 
time could compensate for a large part of the 
anticipated negative economic consequences  
of population ageing in the future. 
Higher immigration volume  
would increase labour force size,  
but much less the essential ratio  
of workers-to-non-workers
To the extent the EU is a destination region  
for international migration, immigration becomes  
an influential factor on demographic 
developments. Policymakers regularly balance 
migration policy with the best interests  
of the Member State. Doing so while being mindful 
of a long-term understanding of demography 
is crucial. At the core of such considerations are 
factors including: the volume of immigrants from 
third countries entering the Member State, their 
levels of education, how well they will integrate 
into the labour market and society at large,  
and how effective the Member State  
is at enforcing their migration policy. 
Migration levels can have a large influence  
on the total population size and the size of the 
labour force.  With no third country immigration, 
the natural decline resulting from lower fertility 
would bring the EU population to 466 million  
by 2060, the level observed in the 1980s. 
However, migration levels have a limited effect 
on changing the EU’s age structure, in part 
because migrants tend to settle for the long 
term and to age just as the native population 
does. As such, irrespective of various levels  
of immigration, the findings of this report show 
an almost inevitable trend towards continued 
demographic ageing in the EU. 
While a high volume of immigration would increase 
the overall size of the EU labour force, it would 
have a limited impact on the proportion  
of workers to non-workers in the long-run.  
If higher immigration volumes were to coincide with 
deteriorating economic integration of migrants, 
it would actually result in a labour force situation 
that is worse than with medium or low volumes  
of immigration, which highlights the importance  
of effective efforts for economic integration.
Westward movement inside the 
EU has substantial impacts on the 
population sizes of Member States
In recent decades, intra-EU mobility – the free 
movement between EU Member States – has 
facilitated population changes within the EU. 
Over the past 25 years, some of the Eastern 
European Member States have lost a large share 
of their population through a combination of low 
fertility and, most notably, sizeable emigration. 
    Greater 
labour force 
participation 
has more impact 
on alleviating 
pressure from 
ageing than 
either fertility 
or migration
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Dramatically, Bulgaria and the Baltic States lost 
between 16% and 26%. 
Intra-EU mobility has the potential to produce large 
population shifts within the EU over time. If the 
movements of recent years persist as they have, 
the population of Romania would reduce from  
19.9 million in 2015 to 13.8 million by 2060 (-30% 
of the population). Conversely, the losses would be 
less than half without intra-EU mobility (only -14%). 
The receiving Member States rely on these flows to 
help compensate for their own ageing populations, 
but the effect on their total populations is more 
limited because they are generally more populous.
Pre-existing economic disparities between Member 
States have encouraged many citizens to search 
for work in places other than their country of origin. 
These developments have likely been to the economic 
benefit of the union as a whole, but not necessarily 
for all sending Member States. This contributes to 
slowing the convergence between Member States, 
and impacts areas such as infrastructure, education 
and even population ageing. This in turn has 
implications for the goals of economic development 
and Cohesion Policy, in particular when the movement 
is disproportionately highly skilled workers educated  
in the sending Member States.
Differences in wages and living standards 
continue to drive westward migration within 
the EU.  Targeting economic inequality between 
Member States can encourage greater cohesion 
and integration and can help those Member States 
facing disproportionate population decline, a loss 
of working-age population, brain drain and more 
pronounced population ageing. Policies should 
address practical, labour-force-oriented skills 
and try to reverse the education selectivity of 
emigration by offering competitive employment 
opportunities to the highly skilled and possibly 
facilitating return migration of some of the talent 
that has left. 
Losing large numbers  
of highly skilled workers leads  
to lower productive potential  
and accelerated population ageing 
The loss of talent to comparatively higher-
income countries continues to confront some 
societies within the EU, and many others around 
the globe. This has demographic implications, 
whereby sending countries find themselves with 
a smaller and less-educated workforce. Such 
changes would coincide with a more rapidly 
ageing population because emigrants tend  
to be early-career adults. The high emigration  
of talent may also negatively impact innovation 
and economic growth. 
As an illustrative example of how high emigration 
impacts demographics, we use a hypothetical case 
of the EU falling far behind in future global 
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competition. By simply extending Spain’s financial 
crisis emigration rates into the future for the EU 
as a whole, we can see how fast high emigration 
depletes the working-age population of the EU – 
50% by 2050 in this hypothetical case. While not  
a scenario to be viewed as a likely future  
for the EU as a whole, it helps demonstrate what 
some countries are facing and how the currently 
observed pattern of net migration inflows should 
not be automatically assumed to continue  
in the long term.
The question of high emigration by educated 
citizens, or ‘brain drain’, highlights the 
interconnectedness between global migration flows 
and local demographics. Therefore, to understand 
the context of the EU’s future population,  
it is also necessary to look beyond the borders  
of the EU. Neighbouring regions such as Africa  
and Western Asia face very different demographic 
and migratory trends. 
Actual realised migration to the EU will, in part, 
depend on its attractiveness as a destination – 
that is, the pull factors created by Member States. 
At the same time, socio-economic development  
in third countries may also increase the propensity 
to undertake migration journeys. Creating  
a system which does not undermine  
the development of human capital in countries  
of origin by making it harder for third countries  
to retain their highest-skilled workers  
is one of many dilemmas.
Pressure from continued population 
growth in Africa and Western Asia  
can lead to an increase in  
push factors for migration 
Africa’s population is projected to increase by a factor 
of two to three over the coming decades, or possibly 
even more in the event of stalled socio-economic 
development. In addition, population growth in 
Western Asia will also be significant. For example,  
the population of Afghanistan is likely to triple  
and that of Pakistan to almost double. Such massive 
projected population increases require consideration 
of the future job opportunities and economic growth. 
The peace and stability necessary to facilitate such 
opportunities may also be challenged by population 
growth. These challenges can contribute to creating 
push factors for migration, that is, conditions that 
drive people to emigrate from their home countries. 
Conflict and insecurity are central push factors. 
Emigration is also linked to people deciding  
to migrate because of a lack of opportunities to 
thrive in their own country, for instance due to high 
youth unemployment and too few appropriate jobs. 
Similarly, climate change can influence migration  
by affecting other push factors of migration such  
as political and economic conditions. For example,  
climate change can be a possible trigger of conflict, 
which in turn would lead to migration. When direct 
climate-change-related migration does occur,  
we find that it tends to be mostly intra-regional.  
   Regardless  
of changes in the 
size of the labour 
force, the human 
capital of future 
workers in the EU 
will be higher than 
it is today
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This is in line with the fact that intra-regional 
migration, for example within Africa, makes up  
by far the largest share of migration globally.
The prospect of climate change and the expected 
population growth in Africa and Western Asia 
are likely to present important challenges. Thus, 
pursuing policies that enhance general resilience 
and local employment opportunities and foster 
stability and security are critical to building 
sustainable alternatives to migration  
in the countries of origin.
Girls’ education matters greatly  
for the future of population growth 
in Africa 
While Africa and Western Asia are facing high 
population growth, many regions of the world have 
progressed towards late stages of the demographic 
transition with low rates of both mortality and 
fertility, notably East Asia, North America and 
Europe. During the second half of the century, 
world population may even eventually peak and 
start to reduce slightly, depending largely on how 
fast fertility levels in Africa fall to moderate levels.
Rapid population growth creates an urgent need 
for expanding education in Africa. Education 
expansion must keep pace with the pressure 
coming from rapid population growth, as it holds 
the key to accelerating the demographic transition 
and bringing development successes within reach. 
Achieving such goals depends, in particular,  
on giving girls access to education, as education 
and family planning are closely intertwined. 
Education broadens horizons and helps bring 
fertility into the realm of conscious choice for both 
women and men. Evidence from educational sub-
populations within countries indicates that higher 
living standards and decisions for moderate fertility 
levels accompany higher education  
and the associated wider range of life choices. 
Demographic changes are long term and occur  
at a steady and predictable pace. This provides  
us with a unique opportunity for foresight 
because it enables us to study how certain  
trends are likely to impact the future populations 
of EU Member States and the world. In this way, 
the scenarios examined in this report help to 
enable evidence-based planning for the future.
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